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RESUMO: Ao estudar os primeiros filósofos gregos, geralmente não é suficiente recorrer apenas aos 
fragmentos. Os testemunhos são úteis e às vezes essenciais para reconstituir suas doutrinas. No 
entanto, lidar com os testemunhos – e nossa principal fonte de testemunhos é Aristóteles e a tradição 
peripatética – pode ser difícil. A crítica de Aristóteles à filosofia pré-socrática de Harold Cherniss 
(1935) foi um marco importante no estudo da transmissão de Aristóteles das doutrinas de seus 
predecessores pré-platônicos. Os críticos de Cherniss, entretanto, foram duros sobre sua leitura de 
Aristóteles. Se Aristóteles distorce intencionalmente as doutrinas pré-socráticas, como os críticos de 
Cherniss o acusam de acusar Aristóteles, então seria muito arriscado usar Aristóteles como fonte. Se 
ele intencionalmente distorce seus antecessores, devemos esperar que ele faça tudo o que puder para 
esconder todos os vestígios disso. No entanto, se ele é sincero, as chamadas distorções podem parecer 
assim porque ele não pode evitar ver seus antecessores através de suas próprias lentes. Neste artigo, 
analiso três tipos paradigmáticos de crítica realizada contra Cherniss: a que visa salvaguardar a 
confiabilidade de Aristóteles como fonte para a filosofia grega antiga, a que pretende salvaguardar seu 
direito ao título de historiador e outra que rejeita ambas as discussões como encobrimento da atividade 
filosófica de Aristóteles. Mesmo que algumas das conclusões de Cherniss sobre as doutrinas dos 
filósofos gregos antigos possam parecer ultrapassadas, seu método geral continua válido: o 
testemunho de Aristóteles deve ser abordado de forma cuidadosa e sistemática, a fim de remover 
interpretações equivocadas e eventuais distorções. Os três tipos de crítica analisados, no entanto, não 
parecem tocar o cerne desse método. Ao contrário, parecem concordar com as premissas básicas, mas 
de alguma forma insistem que a crítica de Cherniss é inapropriada. 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Aristóteles; Pré-Socráticos; Doxografia; Harold Cherniss 
ABSTRACT: When studying the early Greek philosophers, it is usually not enough to recur solely to 
fragments. Testimonies are useful and sometimes key in order to reconstitute their doctrines. However, 
dealing with testimonies — and our major source of testimonies is Aristotle and the peripatetic 
tradition — may be tricky. Harold Cherniss’s Aristotle’s criticism of presocratic philosophy (1935) 
was a major milestone in the study of Aristotle’s transmission of the doctrines of his Preplatonic 
predecessors. Cherniss’s critics, however, have been hard over his reading of Aristotle. If Aristotle 
distorts presocratic doctrines intentionally, as Cherniss’s critics charge him of accusing Aristotle, then 
it would be too risky to use Aristotle as a source. If he intentionally distorts his predecessors, we 
should expect him to do everything he can to hide all traces of it. However, if he is sincere, the so-
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called distortions may seem so because he cannot avoid seeing his predecessors through his own 
lenses. In this paper, I analyze three paradigmatic types of criticism raised against Cherniss: the one 
that aims to safeguard Aristotle’s reliability as a source for early Greek philosophy, the one intended 
to safeguard his right to the title of historian, and another one that rejects both discussions as 
shadowing Aristotle’s philosophical activity. Even if some of Cherniss’s conclusions about the 
doctrines of the early Greek philosophers may seem outdated, his general method stands valid: 
Aristotle’s testimony should be approached in a careful and systematic way in order to remove his 
misinterpretations and eventual distortions. The three types of criticism analyzed, however, do not 
seem to touch the kernel of this method. On the contrary, they seem to agree with the basic premises, 
but somehow insist that Cherniss’s criticism is out of place. 
KEYWORDS: Aristotle; Presocratic; doxography; Harold Cherniss 
 
 
It is a well-known warning that in dealing with the so-called Presocratics one should 
be aware of testimonies. Besides the risk of interference by posterior doctrines, the early 
transmitters were not exactly careful in their reports (by contemporary standards). In the 
absence of the full works, the advice is to refer to fragments, direct quotations made by 
ancient philosophers, commentators and doxographers, posterior, but close enough in time as 
to have had access to the original texts of those early thinkers. However, this is not as 
straightforward as it seems. Quotations, as we know, can be cut out of their contexts and be 
made to fit the discourse of the one who quotes. It is not unusual, even in our own time, that 
an author is made to say the exact opposite of what he act ually said, when quoted. 
Regardless, with the early Greek philosophers, common sense holds that it is much 
safer to refer to fragments rather than testimonies.1 Such a feature of fragments was 
definitively established when the Diels-Kranz catalog became the standard reference for the 
study of Presocratics. It is so useful that with time, it became a source in itself, with its own 
authority.2 
                                                           
1 Cf. Gadamer, 2001, p. 33-34. Gadamer uses the argument of the decontextualization of quotations (not, of 
course, as his main argument) to defend that the only “solid ground” we have for early Greek philosophy is 
actually Plato and Aristotle. His main reason has to do with the fact that theirs are the only complete works we 
have available. Without a single work, as whole, our access to the thoughts of these thinkers becomes severely 
hindered. Without a complete work, he asks, how can we see its internal connections? (2001, p. 23) 
2 A quotation from an early Greek philosopher presented as a DK type B (for fragment) is instantly recognized as 
reliable, even authentic. However, as any source (and DK is invaluable for sure), it has its hypotheses, editions, 
and cuts. Take, for instance, what Jaap Mansfeld says about the mode of presentation of the DK catalog: “Diels’ 
quasi-biographical mode of presentation, though based on a (too) clear hypothesis concerning the transmission, 
effectively obscures its own foundations and also inhibits access to the original sources themselves. The reign of 
the individual Presocratic fragment became firmly established, and the relative reliability of an A-fragment was 
believed to have been securely ascertained by the place assigned to its source in the tradition as reconstructed, 
that is, its counting as good or less good. The verbatim fragments on the other hand were viewed in the way that 
works of art found in the course of a premodern excavation were appreciated, and so as having a value not 
dependent on the ruins that happened to preserve them.” (1999, p. 25) 
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If the philosophers you study do not have a large number of fragments from different 
sources that allows you to cross-examine them, you may have to turn to testimonies not 
merely as the second best alternative, but as your main sources. This is the case with the 
physics of the ancient atomists, for instance.3 Leucippus has only three fragments, none of 
them dealing strictly with atoms and void.4 Democritus, on the other hand, has the greatest 
collection of fragments in the catalog (more than 300), but most of them relate to ethics.5 This 
means that most of what we know about Leucippus and Democritus’ physics is actually 
derived from testimonies.6 Our major source of testimonies about early atomism is Aristotle 
and the doxography that stems from his circle, via Theophrastus.7  
                                                           
3 My particular research interest is the influence of Aristotle’s testimony in our apprehension and comprehension 
of ancient atomism. Especially what we understand as the core of their physical system: atoms and void, the 
foundation of a, so to speak, materialistic building of the physical world, as opposed to a formalistic view, 
deriving from Plato and Aristotle. Yet, to talk of matter and materialism is already to be somehow influenced by 
Aristotle. Not that his influence is in itself a problem. On the contrary, Aristotle forged most of our philosophical 
language and our way of interpreting our own world, which is still full of substances and categories (at least in 
terms of language). 
4 DK 67 B 1 and 1a mention the book known as The Great Cosmology (ΜΕΓΑΣ ΔΙΑΚΟΣΜΟΣ) and its 
attribution to Leucippus. They are not actual quotations, unless you suppose that Leucippus himself gave this 
title to the book. The other fragment (B 2), however, even though related to a work named On Intelligence 
(ΠΕΡΙ ΝΟΥ), contains important insights about the role of necessity and causation, which, of course, have 
implications for his physics. A note from DK right after B 1a says that terms such as ἄτομοι, ναστά, μέγα κενόν, 
ἀποτομή, ῥυσμός, διαθιγή, τροπή, περιπάλαξις, δῖνος, etc. can only be found in doxographic sources. 
5 There are no more than 15 fragments that can be considered strictly about physics; some of them appear more 
than once (DK 68 B 9, 117 and 125, which also appears in testimony A 49). The long B 5 should be considered a 
testimony (type A). It is what Diels understood as a summary of The Little Cosmology (ΜΙΚΡΟΣ 
ΔΙΑΚΟΣΜΟΣ), but contains only a few isolated words that are indicated (by Diels) to have been used by 
Democritus himself. B 0a to 28c refer to the works attributed to Democritus. B 35 to B 115 are the Sentences of 
Democrates, mostly ethical gnōmai, which some attribute to Democritus (and Diels accept it), but cf. C. C. W. 
Taylor, who says that “The ‘Democrates’ sayings . . . contain no sign of Democritean technical vocabulary, with 
one possible . . . exception, the occurrence of the word skēnos” (1999, p. 225). B 120 to B 141 are definitions, a 
sort of lexicon, mostly dealing with medicine, with a few exceptions (as B 141, which defines idea, and makes it 
refer to the smallest bodies). B 169 to B 298a is a long list of ethical sentences. From B 298b onward, the 
fragments are considered spurious. 
6 Thales and Anaximander are other examples of philosophers with zero (in the case of the former) or almost 
zero (in the case of the latter) actual B-type fragments. What we know about them is almost entirely dependent 
on Aristotelian or Peripatetic testimonia, even though Aristotle himself, in the case of Thales, let us know that 
what he reports is mostly hearsay (Metaph. A, 984a1). 
7 Aetius and Simplicius are other important sources, but the number of testimonies extracted from the works of 
Aristotle surpasses theirs. For a good account of the sources about the atomists, see the introduction of Walter 
Lezsl’s I Primi Atomisti (2009). About the role of Aristotle (in contrast with the lack of nominated references in 
the Platonic corpus) and the peripatetic tradition he says: “Aristotele invece fa numerosi riferimenti espressi (e 
anche non espressi) a Democrito, talvolta associandolo a Leucippo (raramente si riferisce al solo Leucippo). 
Sono riferimenti che per quantità sono inferiori solo ai riferimenti da lui fatti ad Empedocle. La sua 
testimonianza è dunque di grande importanza per la ricostruzione del pensiero dei primi atomisti. Ma è di grande 
importanza anche in modo indiretto, perché il suo approccio, in particolare per certi schemi da lui usati, 
influenza fortemente gran parte dell’esposizione successiva del pensiero atomistico e soprattutto la dossografia. 
Talvolta questa riprende pure i contenuti, cioè riprende certe tesi che egli attribuisce ai primi atomisti . . . 
Dipendono in modo significativo da Aristotele certi suoi commentatori e particolarmente Simplicio . . . Sesto 
Empirico, nostro testimone importante per l’epistemologia democritea, deve dipendere da altre fonti, ma le sue 
testimonianze sui fondamenti dell’atomismo sono tipicamente dossografiche . . . Fra gli autori antichi ci sono gli 
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That we should beware of Aristotle’s testimony about the early Greek philosophers is 
not new advice. One of the first who sounded the alarm was Harold Cherniss, back in 1935, 
with his Aristotle’s Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy, in which he undertook a systematic 
critique of the use Aristotle makes of the first philosophers. Cherniss’s view was that, to 
Aristotle, the discoveries of his predecessors functioned as a sort of substrate over which he 
could produce and present his own philosophy. Although by his time it was already “vaguely 
recognized that Aristotle was capable of setting down something other than the objective truth 
when he had occasion to write about his predecessors” (Cherniss, 1935, p. ix), Cherniss 
perceived that many historians of philosophy would still be less than cautions about the use 
they made of Aristotle’s testimonies. If, on the one hand, there is the strong argument that 
Aristotle is one of the nearest witnesses available to us,8 on the  other hand, his report is 
deeply affected by his own theory and his Platonic background9 almost to the point of 
indissociability. Yet, there were many — at least in Cherniss’s time, and according to his 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Epicurei, il cui rapporto stretto col primo atomismo, per averne ripreso la dottrina seppure con significative 
modificazioni, è ben noto . . . Va solo tenuto presente che in alcuni casi anche le loro testimonianze possono 
rientrare nell’alveo delle testimonianze di tipo dossografico o per lo meno risentire dell’interpretazione 
aristotelica” (p. XII-XIII). 
8 The relative proximity of Aristotle to early Greek philosophers, not only in time, but especially in mind, is 
stressed by W. K. C. Guthrie (1957), and it is probably his best argument when defending Aristotle’s reliability 
against what he understands to be Cherniss’s and J. B. McDiarmid’s (1953) attacks on Aristotle as a witness. I 
will return to this dispute later. There is good reason to consider Aristotle’s reports as better than Plato’s, if you 
consider at least the form of the transmission speech. No matter how philosophically rich, Plato’s dialogues are 
still poetic compositions, with characters, plots and different layers of action and discourse. Preplatonic theories 
presented in the mouth of different characters might acquire different tones, according to the discussion at hand. 
These different points of view are not always immediately given nor straightforwardly identifiable. Such features 
do not in any way compromise Plato’s philosophical message, but it certainly complicates the work of 
reconstitution of the doctrines of the early Greek philosophers. 
9 This Platonic background is somewhat important, not only because of Plato’s — as well as Socrates’s— 
innovations in terms of philosophical terminology and concepts, but especially because of dialectics. Aristotle 
probably began his philosophical lessons in the Academy by reading dialogues. He must have learned to 
philosophize by exercising dialectics, and eventually became a writer of dialogues himself. Even though the 
portion of his corpus to which we have access is composed mainly of treatises and/or class notes, we know by 
Cicero’s testimony that he was a prolific and talented author of dialogues (cf., for instance, Academica Priora 
II.38.119). The dialectical procedure he adopts when dealing with his predecessors is not only an issue of 
method, but, also, I believe, he has this dialogical verve in him. I would say he thinks in dialogs, even when he 
writes in the form of treatise. So, that when he puts the theories of one philosopher against another, or against his 
own, he could be actually thinking in the form of a fictional discussion between characters, as in a play. As in a 
play, with a plot, those discussions must amount to something in the final composition. Catherine Collobert 
(2002) has a good description of Aristotle’s dialectical method. She even articulates it very well with her view of 
Aristotle as a historian of philosophy, stressing the teleological approach to history, about which I will say 
something later. Please, take heed, however, that what I am saying in this note refers exclusively to a possible 
mode of composition that Aristotle could have had, that is, of how he puts his thoughts into paper, after he has 
come to his conclusions. It is not, therefore, a judgement on his method of research, which I am assuming as 
being prior to its eventual transcription. 
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testimony — that would still take Aristotle’s reports for granted.10 The most common error in 
the utilization of Aristotle’s testimony would be exactly this: to ignore him as Aristotle, the 
philosopher, and that he had an agenda, and to take his account as historical in a strict sense.11 
As Cherniss repeatedly warns, “[t]here are no ‘doxographical’ accounts in the works of 
Aristotle, because Aristotle was not a doxographer but a philosopher seeking to construct a 
complete and final philosophy. For him — as for every philosopher — the doctrines of his 
predecessors were materials to be remoulded for his own purpose” (1935, p. 347). 
But what to do when the material you have is so scarce that you have no other way 
except to recourse to Aristotle’s testimony? “[I]n their new form they can be of use to the 
historian of philosophy only if Aristotle’s process of interpretation can be reversed so as to 
regenerate them in the form they had before Aristotle employed them as his material.” (p. 
347) But is that even possible? Probably not. Yet, we might raise different hypotheses and 
defend them as more or less likely. Either way, it seems very unlikely that Aristotle’s report is 
the one with which we should settle down as it is presented, if our intention is to work some 
sort of reconstitution of early Greek philosophy. This does not mean, however, that Aristotle’s 
account should be disregarded as worthless. On the contrary. 
Even if eighty years later some of Cherniss’s premises and conclusions about early 
Greek philosophers may seem outdated or even exaggerated,12 his method of critique remains 
valid: not to assume the Aristotelian report as immediately reflecting the very letter or spirit of 
the Presocratic doctrines, but to approach his testimony in a systematic way, always taking 
into account its particular and expanded contexts. Moreover, Aristotle’s report should only be 
judged after we are clear enough about the reasons that moved him to mobilize the doctrines 
                                                           
10 Cherniss mentions scholars of his time who, although recognizing this problem, would still, somehow, neglect 
it or slip upon it sometimes. There were also those who would simply ignore it. He mentions John Burnet (1920 
(Cherniss cites from the 2nd ed., 1908)), who, although recognizing the problem, apparently would ignore it at 
times, and Paul Natorp (“Aristoteles und die Eleaten” Philosophische Monatshefte 26 (1890): 1-16; 147-169) 
and Otto Gilbert ("Aristoteles' Urteile über die pythagoreische Lehre" Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 22 
(1909): 28-48, 145-165) who would take Aristotle’s account as being close to the consistent account of a 
professed historian of philosophy (Cherniss, 1935, p. xi). 
11 I say “strict sense” because part of the critique against Cherniss has to do with the broad range that the term 
history and its correlates assume, particularly the title historian (cf., for instance, Collobert, 2002). Cherniss 
denied Aristotle the title of historian, based on a modern understanding of the profession, as I am calling it. His 
denial has to do with the criteria for the historiographical research. Against him, some, like Guthrie (1957), 
Martial Gueroult (Dianoématique, Philosophie de l’histoire de la philosophie, Livre II (Paris: Aubier-
Montaigne, 1979)), Collobert herself and David E. T. Maqueo (1998) defend the right of Aristotle to the title of 
historian. But I think this discussion avoids the core of Cherniss’s critique, and that is the quality of his historical 
report in terms of the possibility of a reconstitution of Prearistotelian doctrines, free as much as possible (if that 
is even possible) from “Aristotelian biases”. 
12 Cf. Mansfeld, 1999, p. 41 (n. 23). 
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and the thinkers he employs. We could summarize what I am calling “Cherniss’s method” in a 
few questions that should be raised every time Aristotle calls forth an author or a doctrine: 
• What is the reason for the mobilization of this author and this doctrine in this 
particular context? 
• What is the part that this mobilization plays in the overall context of this particular 
moment in Aristotle’s argumentation? 
• Against whom — which authors and which doctrines — this particular one is 
interposed? 
• What is the actual result — its outcome within Aristotle’s argument — of this 
mobilization? 
• What kinds of problems — or “errors” as Cherniss says — can be found in this 
particular mobilization?13 
• In what other passages — even and especially in other works and contexts — does 
Aristotle mobilize the same author referring to the same doctrine? In those passages, is 
his account consistent with this one? If negative, what are the differences? What can 
be concluded based on them? 14 
                                                           
13 Cherniss furnishes a detailed catalog with at least seven classes of “errors” that Aristotle commits regularly 
(1935, p. 352-357). (1) The first class he names “wilful misrepresentation”, where Aristotle omits particular 
portions of a doctrine that do not fit properly into his current argument, e.g. the Sphere of Empedocles that 
sometimes is one fused being, and sometimes is a composition of elements. (2) The second class is the 
“accommodation and reinterpretation” of doctrines whose texts he presents without misrepresentation, e.g. the 
interpretation that the formula “like to like” refer to his theory of the actualization of the potential. (3) The third 
class is “unadorned misunderstanding”, as when he reads the word “contrary” as referring to the contraries in his 
own theory of alteration. (4) The fourth class is the “translation” of earlier theories into his own terminology, 
which, by the way, is mostly what doxography is about; e.g. the criticism of the process of separation (or 
segregation) in Anaxagoras, which he understands to mean the separation of qualities, which is impossible in his 
own system. (5) The fifth class is the “supposition that current ideas must have been present in earlier times”, or 
good old anachronism, e.g. the supposition that the reconciliation of the notions of generation and alteration (his 
own problem) was an actual problem for all of his predecessors. (6) The sixth class is the development of 
“’necessary antecedents’ or ‘necessary consequences’ of earlier statements.” This is not an error in itself, except 
for the problem that the necessary links between these conclusions are based on Aristotle’s own axioms. He 
takes, for instance, the principles of the Ionians as referring to his own prime matter. (7) The seventh class has to 
do with the “historical relationship” between the various thinkers. This appears in the different groupings he 
makes, relating, for instance, Empedocles and the atomists to the material monists (taking Empedocles Sphere as 
being one, and the atoms as having an underlying common material). The groupings vary according to the 
context and create relationships that sometimes are historically impossible. This, however, one might say, is an 
issue to this day, mediated by the doxographical and successions’ traditions, since there is yet discussion about 
the relationships between the various early Greek philosophers. 
14 I take most of these questions from Cherniss’s  “Introduction”, where he explains the general plan of his 
method. “Aristotle’s belief that all previous theories were stammering attempts to express his own, , aids him in 
interpreting those theories out of all resemblance to their original form. He is openly frank about his method of 
setting down the ‘inner meaning’ of Presocratic doctrines even when such procedure necessitates the 
‘articulation’ of implications of which the original author was unaware and results in a system exactly contrary 
to that which the original text sets forth. Anaxagoras mistook the meaning of his own words, says Aristotle. In 
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These checks should actually apply to any source we use. In the case of Aristotle, 
however, the first three are particularly important since he is not, as Cherniss says, a 
“doxographer”. What he means by doxographer is an author who is expressly interested in 
giving an account of past doctrines in contemporary language. Even if the so-called ancient 
doxographers would be subject to interpretation flaws, anachronisms and every other “error” 
that can be found in Aristotle, the different attitude towards the ancient doctrines is what 
matters here. While a “mean” doxographer may have a hidden agenda when selecting 
quotations and composing his report, the “sincere” doxographer would be willing to furnish 
the best translation he can as materials for others (or even himself) to work on. It is likely that 
the procedure of Aristotle was to gather “doxographical” material prior to the elaboration of 
his treatises.15 The works of the peripatetics: Theophrastus, Eudemus and Meno attest to 
that.16 This type of work, however, is not final, but only a means to an end. There is reason to 
believe that, to Aristotle, mere doxographical accounts would seem of little value as final 
works. ‘Doxography’, as Mansfeld reminds us, is a neologism introduced by Diels.17 Aristotle 
would probably consider them as mere historia, which for him, taken by themselves, had little 
or no philosophical relevance at all. While historia deals with reports about the particular, 
philosophia must have something to say about universals.18 In his philosophical writings, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
such a way, he manages to produce interlocutors for his debates who will espouse the opinions necessary for his 
conclusion. From this it appears that each ‘debate’ must be treated as a whole and the validity of the reports and 
interpretations judged separately in each case. Moreover, the criticism which Aristotle gives in the several 
passages has an importance equal to the reports themselves, since it is from this criticism that we may expect to 
find the motive for the report and for its special form. Finally, if the criticism is to be understood, the doctrine to 
which it is meant to lead must be analyzed briefly, for this it is which motivates the critique as the critique 
motivates the report. Then it will be possible to compare the statements which occur in different places with 
some hope of discovering the reason for the variations; and once the reason is so established there is a good 
chance with the aid of our other criteria of stripping off the Aristotelian form or at least of establishing in what 
direction the statement is likely to have deviated from the original meaning of the theory reported.” (1935, p. xii-
xiii; the italics are mine.) 
15 I do not refer to the doxographical summary that appear in first chapters of many of Aristotle’s treatises, but to 
an extensive collection and cataloging of doctrines prior to the elaboration of the treatises and its first chapters’ 
summaries. The result would be a collection of particular doctrines in the form of quotations or brief reports, 
with an initial actualization of vocabulary, not yet articulated into the dialectic schemes into which they would 
be presented later. This procedure is detailed by Aristotle himself in Topics I, 14 (105a34-b25). See also 
Mansfeld, 1999, p. 28-30. 
16 The three were from the Lyceum. Theophrastus and his Physical Opinions (ΦΙΣΙΚΑΙ ΔΟΞΑΙ) is probably the 
main source of the doxographical tradition; Eudemus worked on histories of theology, astronomy and 
mathematics; and Meno had a history of medicine (see G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, 1957, p. 3). 
17 See Mansfeld, 1999, p. 23. 
18 The understanding of the term historia (ἱστορία) is crucial for the discussion of the character of Aristotle’s 
appropriation and use of the doctrines of his predecessors. According to David T. Runia, there is confusion about 
this term, which is read anachronistically (2009, p. 14). This is decisive when deciding the character not only of 
Aristotle’s procedure, but also of Theophrastus’. A good account of the meaning of historia for Aristotle, and 
what should be his philosophy of history in face of his view of historia, as well as its contrast to the aim of 
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then, Aristotle must build something new out of materials previously gathered in the form of 
historia. 
The foremost critique of Cherniss’s work was made by W. K. C. Guthrie in a rather 
short article named “Aristotle as a Historian of Philosophy: Some Preliminaries”, from 1957. 
Guthrie’s reaction seems to have been triggered by J. B. McDiarmid’s “Theophrastus on the 
Presocratic Causes”, from 1953, which contains what we could call an extreme interpretation 
of Cherniss. McDiarmid’s monograph, although focused in Theophrastus,19 is important here 
because there is a sort of polemic triangle between the three of them. Even though Guthrie 
states that, in his opinion, Cherniss might have gone a little too far, he seems to be even more 
worried with the consequences of a certain reading of his critique, which he identifies in 
McDiarmid’s work. The essentials of this triangular polemic have been accurately presented 
and analyzed by J. G. Stevenson (1974). Here I just want to emphasize a few things. 
The kernel of Guthrie’s dispute is the reliability of Aristotle’s testimony about early 
Greek philosophers. While Cherniss’s intention seems to have been to warn the modern 
historian of philosophy about the difficulties and perils he will face when trying to 
reconstitute the doctrines of those thinkers from Aristotle’s reports, McDiarmid seems to 
advance a lot further and declare Aristotle’s testimony and Theophrastus’ as being corrupted 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
philosophia, is given by C. Thomas Powell in “Why Aristotle has no Philosophy of History” (1987). I will return 
to this later. 
19 McDiarmid’s thesis is that Theophrastus’ report in the Physical Opinions is thoroughly dependent on 
Aristotle’s own account of early Greek philosophy, with minimal — and usually damaging — interference by 
Theophrastus himself. This implies that Theophrastus shared the same attitude of Aristotle when dealing with his 
predecessors, and that Theophrastus actually used Aristotle as a source for his work. According to McDiarmid, 
Theophrastus tries to combine and harmonize testimonies found in different works of Aristotle, which, 
sometimes are even contradictory, making his own report confused and contradictory. He also finds in 
Theophrastus the same types of “errors” committed by Aristotle (see n. 12 above), worsened by the fact that 
these same errors are sometimes committed not only over the early thinkers, but on top of Aristotle’s 
interpretation as well. Besides the rather harsh tone used by McDiarmid (which, in my opinion, exacerbate and 
extrapolates the tone of Cherniss’s critique), one problem I find with his criticism of Theophrastus is that he 
assumes a certain linearity between his and Aristotle’s composition, which recalls the successions’ biographic 
schemas. McDiarmid’s Theophrastus seems to have started his work after Aristotle had completed his, and used 
Aristotle’s finished books as sources in the same way he could have used other sources such as Hippias or 
Gorgias. However, it seems to me more likely that Theophrastus work would have been at least initiated while 
he was a student or a collaborator of Aristotle in his own research. If this was the case then, the reason why his 
report would resemble Aristotle’s might not be because Aristotle was his major source, but because they were 
actually working together while gathering material from other sources. He sure could have reviewed his Physical 
Opinions many times later after Aristotle’s death, and even may have felt the need to reconcile certain passages 
from the written works of Aristotle. The problem with this account is that McDiarmid implies that Aristotle is a 
major source of error (and intentional distortion of his predecessors), but he ignores that Aristotle himself might 
have been influenced by other indirect sources such as Hippias and Gorgias, who may have actually started the 
doxographical tradition prior to Plato and Aristotle (see Runia, 2009, p. 7-8). 
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beyond repair.20 Although Guthrie provides the reader with the means to discern between 
Cherniss’s position and that of McDiarmid,21 the way in which he moves from one to the 
other along the article tends to combine them, as if the “disciple’s discourse” was a necessary 
consequence of the “master’s”.22 Guthrie’s take on the discussion, however, is not restricted 
to the reliability issue. Together with his defense of the effective quality of Aristotle as a 
source, he also raises what Stevenson calls a “moral aspect”: to defend the honor of the great 
Aristotle against those who try (willingly or not) to defile it (Stevenson, 1974, p. 139). 
Regarding the reliability issue, I share Stevenson’s opinion that Guthrie was not very 
successful in proving his point (1974, p. 138). He presents three arguments. The first being 
that since Aristotle is one of the major sources for the study of the Presocratics, if his 
testimony is not reliable, then it is not worthwhile to study the Presocratics at all (Guthrie, 
1957, p. 36; Stevenson, 1974, p. 140). But one thing does not follow the other. Even if that 
was a true outcome of Cherniss’s work, it remains the fact that Aristotle is not our only source 
on the early Greek philosophers. The second argument has to do with Aristotle being so nice 
as to inform us when he has stopped quoting a Presocratic and has started to give us his own 
interpretation (Guthrie, 1957, p. 36; Stevenson, 1974, p. 140). That does not mean, however, 
                                                           
20 McDiarmid’s choice of words, at least, seems too harsh: “The question of Aristotle’s bias has been dealt with 
exhaustively by H. Cherniss in his Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy. Cherniss has found that 
Aristotle's accounts of earlier doctrines are so inextricably bound up with arguments for his own doctrine that 
history cannot be easily distinguished from interpretation. Aristotle is not interested in historical facts as such at 
all. He is constructing his own system of philosophy, and his predecessors are of interest to him only insofar as 
they furnish material to this end. He believes that his system is final and inclusive and that, therefore, all earlier 
thinkers have been groping toward it and can be stated in its terms. Holding this belief, he does not hesitate to 
modify or distort not only the detailed views but also the fundamental attitudes of his predecessors or to make 
articulate the implications that doctrines may have for him but could not have had for their authors . . . Thus, 
there is no constancy in the historical value of his comments; nor is there even such a thing as the Aristotelian 
interpretation.” (1953, p. 86; underlines are mine). 
21 In pages 35-36 Guthrie presents two quotations — the first from McDiarmid — in which the attentive reader 
can discern McDiarmid’s harshness (1957, p. 86; see my n. 19 above) versus Cherniss’s careful choice of words: 
“Aristotle as a philosopher is, of course, entirely justified in inquiring what answer any of the Presocratic 
systems could give to the problem of causality as he had formulated it; but to suppose that such an inquiry is 
historical, that is, to suppose that any of these systems was elaborated with a view to that problem as formulated 
by Aristotle, is likely to lead to misinterpretation of those systems themselves and certainly involves the 
misinterpretation of the motives and intentions of their authors.” (1951, p. 320; Guthrie prefers to use Cherniss’s 
1951 article, where he presents an overall picture of Presocratic philosophy, obviously taking his 1935 
conclusions into account). Guthrie, however, does not emphasize the differences. For instance: while for 
Cherniss, Aristotle’s procedure (i.e. to ask his own questions of his predecessors, even if some of these questions 
did not present themselves to them) is “entirely justified” as a philosophical method, with McDiarmid it becomes 
an utterly unscrupulous distortion of anything Presocratic. 
22 It is understandable that Guthrie did so for McDiarmid claims allegiance to Cherniss’s project. In fact, he 
mentions in a note that Cherniss read his manuscript and “urged the undertaking of this study” (1953, p. 85, n. 
1). If he did not like his tone, Cherniss could have warned or requested him to change it. However, he could as 
well have stepped back from doing just that as a sign of scholarly respect. The fact remains that while there is 
material in Cherniss that may justify some reaction, depending on the reader’s take, in McDiarmid there is no 
room for relativizing his attacks on Aristotle. 
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that we can assume he will do this every time, nor does it make him more or less honest, as a 
rule; it does not even improve his interpretation. The third argument is the only one that has 
some strength, and I have actually mentioned something similar earlier: Aristotle was much 
closer to those philosophers than we are. Guthrie says that he was himself an Ionian, implying 
that for that reason he would probably be far better equipped than we are to understand how 
their minds functioned (Guthrie, 1957, p. 37; Stevenson, 1974, p. 141).23 However, once 
again, this does not imply that his interpretation is a reliable one. It certainly, as Stevenson 
says, gives him the “opportunity to be a better interpreter than we have even the chance to 
be.” But there is no way to decide “a priori”, Stevenson concludes, “whether Aristotle’s 
interpretations of the Presocratics are on the whole reliable or trustworthy.” (Stevenson 1974, 
p. 141) 
Oddly enough, the “moral aspect” of the polemic — which Stevenson deliberately 
ignores for it appears to him not scholarly relevant (1974, p. 139) — seems to have been more 
resilient than expected. The defense of the reliability of Aristotle’s testimony seems to come 
together with a defense of his sincerity. It is as if the questioning of Aristotle’s effectiveness 
as a transmitter of his predecessors’ thoughts would cast a shadow over his honesty as a 
scholar. Guthrie’s identification of Cherniss’s statements with possible extrapolations of these 
same statements (as the ones found in McDiarmid) seems to have turned Cherniss himself 
into a sort of enemy of Aristotle.24 Now, if Aristotle distorts his predecessors’ doctrines 
intentionally, it would be too risky to use him as a source. If he intentionally distorts his 
predecessors, we should expect him to do everything he can to hide all traces of it. I do not 
think that Cherniss takes this route. Aristotle (as defended by Guthrie and all of Cherniss’s 
critics) was a serious researcher with a declared interest in finding what he called “the truth”. 
He built himself a logic and employed advanced research methods that are clearly his own 
innovations. What if we now have new criteria, presumably more rigorous than the ones he 
had, for certain aspects of the historical research? There is a whole discipline we call History 
of Philosophy, and there is a Philosophy of History as well. Cherniss’s critique of his method 
is not aimed at questioning his sincerity. Its goal is to allow us to read through his 
                                                           
23 The part about Aristotle being an Ionian is debatable. The Greek language he used had already undergone 
about two hundred years of change. Moreover, the social and the political configurations of his time were much 
different from those of the times of the earlier Ionians. Yet, Guthrie’s argument works if one takes into account 
that these two hundred years that separate Aristotle from them are much less than the 2,500 years that separate us 
from them. He was also a native speaker of Greek (which we are not) no matter how different the Greek 
language would be by his time. 
24 Guthrie actually charges McDiarmid of implying Aristotle’s dishonesty (1957, p. 36). 
ANAIS DE FILOSOFIA CLÁSSICA, vol. 10 nº 19, 2016 
ISSN 1982-5323 
Gomes, Gustavo Laet 
The philosopher, his predecessors, the commentator and his critics: on the criticism of Harold Cherniss’s 




unavoidable misinterpretations. If Aristotle is sincere, the so-called distortions we may find in 
his reports on the early Greek philosophers may seem so because he cannot avoid seeing his 
predecessors through his own lenses. As Aristotle was not a modern historian of philosophy, 
we cannot expect him to avoid certain anachronisms; which is good. Because since he would 
not be attempting to hide something he probably does not even notice, we may actually be 
able to decode something of what he read in his predecessors. In order to do so, we have to 
understand how Aristotle’s dialectical method for mobilizing them functioned. Then, we may 
try to apply retrospectively the methodological rigor (according to our own standards) that he 
may have lacked. Instead of criticizing Aristotle to the extent of making him useless for 
historical purposes, Cherniss was trying to understand the way Aristotle thought. Instead of 
narrowing the field of Presocratic historical research over Aristotle’s testimony, he was 
actually opening a safer path. 
Starting out from Guthrie’s title (“Aristotle as a Historian”) another branch of 
defenses of Aristotle sprouted, the one intended to safeguard his title of historian.25 Catherine 
Collobert (2002) take the discussion from this stand. She asks herself the question “Is 
Aristotle finally a historian of philosophy?” This question in its turn demands the definition of 
‘history of philosophy’. She argues that “neither Cherniss nor Guthrie raises the question of 
the nature of this history — their discussion dealing mainly with the reliability of Aristotle’s 
testimony.” (p. 282) She brings in Martial Gueroult, who defends Aristotle as “the founder of 
ancient philosophical historiography”.26 This thought implies that it is exactly because 
Aristotle chooses to philosophize using the early Greek philosophers as his material that he is 
doing history of philosophy. This line of thought opposes the philosophical use of earlier 
doctrines to mere doxography, the simple transmission of notices from earlier doctrines 
adapted to the current philosophical language of the time (Collobert, 2002, p. 287).27 
Doxography for its own sake would probably appear to Aristotle as a sort of historia, in the 
Greek sense, a type of research that in the Poetics he considers inferior to poetry, let alone 
philosophy.28 The problem with historia is that it lacks a telos. C. Thomas Powell (1987), in 
                                                           
25 As Stevenson (1974) showed, Guthrie’s aim was not exactly to safeguard Aristotle’s title of historian, even 
though he raises this topic in his last paragraph. 
26 Martial Gueroult, Dianoématique, Philosophie de l’histoire de la philosophie, Livre II (Paris: Aubier-
Montaigne, 1979), p. 53 quoted (and translated) in Collobert, 2002, p. 283. 
27 Collobert refers this notion to Michael Frede, “Doxographie, historiographie philosophique et historiographie 
historique de la philosophie,” Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 3 (1992). 
28 “The distinction between historian and poet is not in the one writing prose and the other verse . . . it consists 
really in . . . that the one describes the thing that has been, and the other a kind of thing that might be. Hence 
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an article about the apparent lack of a Philosophy of History in Aristotle, explains the 
difference between what Aristotle would call historia and the actual practice of a historian, 
such as Thucydides. Although dealing with a different context,29 his description of the type of 
history to which Aristotle would adhere is very enlightening. Is it not curious that Aristotle’s 
critique of history would appear just in his treatise on poetry, and as a counterexample for his 
eulogy of tragedy? 
“The deficiency of history for Aristotle is not that it pertains to what actually happens, 
rather that it does not deal explicitly and intentionally with what could probably or necessarily 
happen in a way that yields a philosophically broad understanding of the kinds of things that 
do happen.” (Powell, 1987, p. 350-351) Powell argues that history, properly speaking, to be of 
value for Aristotle should be a sort of narrative. Like tragedy, it should have a protagonist and 
a telos — an end — not merely as something opposed to a beginning, but especially as 
something of the order of “what could probably or necessarily happen”, which, in its turn, is 
of the order of the universal, hence philosophical. Collobert emphasizes the same thing: “A 
history of philosophy supposes, even implicitly, a philosophy of history, which is, for 
Aristotle, a teleological conception of philosophy’s development.” (2002, p. 287) In this sense 
Aristotle sure can be called a historian, as wants Gueroult, but this is not, I would argue, 
something contra Cherniss. There is no doubt that Aristotle can be counted in a tradition of 
historians of philosophy; and if the history of philosophy is somehow philosophical,30 it is 
certainly fair to take Aristotle as a sort of patron of the discipline. Notwithstanding, there is no 
contradiction between this acknowledgement and Cherniss’s critique of Aristotle. For 
Cherniss attributes exactly this proceeding to Aristotle, namely his teleological dealings with 
the doctrines of his predecessors — and this is exactly what he wants us to be aware of. To 
assign or not the title of historian to Aristotle does not make his account more or less 
trustworthy. It is simply a matter of convention, of what one intends to include into the scope 
of that activity. Also, to say that the doctrines of the philosophers from the past work as 
materials to construct one’s own philosophy (Cherniss, 1935, p. 347) does not mean to reduce 
this philosophy in any way. On the contrary, it is for many people an intrinsic part of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
poetry is something more philosophic (φιλοσοφώτερον) and of graver import than history, since its statements 
are rather of the nature of universals, whereas those of history are singulars.” (Poetics, 1451a35-b5; this 
translation is proposed by Powell, 1987, p. 344.) 
29 Although he mentions Thales as an example (p. 352), he does not emphasize Aristotle’s dealings with the 
early Greek philosophers, nor mentions Cherniss, Guthrie and their polemic. 
30 Cf. Pierre Aubenque, 1992 and Jacques Brunschwig (1992). 
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philosophical practice. However, when the historian of philosophy sets himself the task of 
reconstituting the doctrines of past philosophers he should be aware of this procedure, and 
take double care not to be eluded into assuming one philosopher’s interpretation of another as 
the actual and authentic doctrine of the latter. 
Christopher P. Long (2006) takes the discussion further into the arena of Aristotle’s 
philosophical practice. According to him, Aristotle’s dealings with his predecessors are 
central to his own methodology. Since at least some amount of truth can be found in the 
works of previous philosophers,31 inquiry should start with the things that have already been 
said before — or ta legomena.32 This is why Aristotle must turn to the words of his 
predecessors, even as his materials (if one wants to call it that way). These are ta legomena, 
what is available to him, what constitutes his world with its possibilities of engagement. This 
approach is somewhat different from the one I have just been discussing. It is not a matter of 
including Aristotle among the practitioners of a thing called “History of Philosophy” 
anymore, which Long — and maybe Aristotle himself — would probably reject as mere 
“historicism without philosophy”.33 What is at stake now is the very nature of Aristotle’s 
philosophical method, a method that depends deeply of an engagement with the philosophical 
thought of his time, which is the one of his predecessors. Long, emphasizes the great respect 
that Aristotle must have had towards them.34 “Aristotle pauses to listen to his predecessors 
because he recognizes that we are always already determined by the history in which we are 
embedded, that our thinking is inherently an inherited thinking and that our questions find 
faint responses, barely discernable echoes, that resonate in the voices of the past.” (2006, p. 
256) This is why it is philosophically legitimate for Aristotle to ask his own questions to his 
predecessors. For Long, the “‘stammering’ attempts”35 Cherniss reads in the words of 
Aristotle become valuable — even if faint — anticipations of the answers he seeks. 
                                                           
31 See Metaph. α 1, 993a30-b3. 
32 Literally, things said. “Indeed, this orientation toward the things said by those who came before runs 
throughout Aristotle’s work, from his investigation into nature, to his treatment of the soul, to his inquiry into 
ethics; for in each case, the investigation into the truth begins where we find ourselves, always already addressed 
by the things said by our predecessors.” (Long, 2006, p. 248) 
33 Along with Gadamer: “[T]he crucial thing in my lectures on the Presocratics is that I begin neither with Thales 
nor with Homer, nor do I begin with the Greek language in the second century before Christ; I begin instead with 
Plato and Aristotle. This, in my judgment, is the sole philosophical access to an interpretation of the Presocratics. 
Everything else is historicism without philosophy.” (Gadamer, 2001, p. 10; translated by Rod Coltman). 
34 He quotes Aristotle himself: “And it is just to feel gratitude not only to those whose opinions one shares, but 
even to those whose pronouncements were more superficial, for they too contributed something, since before us 
they exercised the active condition of thinking.” (Metaph. α 1, 993b11-15; the translation is Long’s) 
35 Cf. Cherniss, 1935, p. 348. 
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I do not disagree with what Long says about Aristotle’s method and the way he 
engages in his dialogues with his predecessors. It is clearly about opening possibilities of the 
future, by asking questions of the present out of the past (2006, p. 256). However, when he 
places this speech as a defense against the “Cherniss menace”, I think he is aiming his blows 
at the wrong target. He says, for instance, that “[t]his dialogue [of the present with the past] 
cannot be oriented by an attempt simply to reconstruct the thought of past thinkers.” (p. 256) 
But this is exactly what Cherniss is saying. If someone is engaged not in understanding 
Aristotle’s own philosophy, or in producing his own philosophy from things said (ta 
legomena) by Aristotle, but actually in reconstructing the doctrines of early Greek 
philosophers, then — and only then — he must be fully conscious that this is the case: that 
Aristotle’s testimony does not correspond verbatim to the philosophy of those thinkers. 
Long’s argument has nothing to do with the reliability of Aristotle’s testimony (the polemic of 
Guthrie), neither with Aristotle as a historian (as in Gueroult and Collobert).36 He rejects both 
discussions as non-philosophical. Yet, it seems to him that Cherniss’s critique somehow 
demerits Aristotle’s method of beginning with ta legomena, because Aristotle is not taking his 
predecessors words literally, but listening to them with contemporary ears. But why should 
we not engage in this type of reconstruction that Cherniss is worried about? 
I see in Long’s position a sort of paradox. Yes, ta legomena are fundamental to the 
construction of Aristotle’s own philosophy, and they are not mere rhetorical devices — the 
search for confirmation by the “authority of the ancients”. To charge him of manipulating the 
things said by the ancients to make them converge to his own system may really be going too 
far. All of Cherniss’s critics reinforce this charge and they are right to do so. However, this is 
McDiarmid’s reading; Cherniss tends to be more careful with such a type of accusation. 
Aristotle is really and carefully listening to ta legomena and taking them to be his very 
phainomena.37 The paradox is that, while the past is certainly a bridge to the future, ta 
legomena cannot be frozen into one static past. The dialogue with ta legomena from the past 
                                                           
36 In fact, he openly agrees that Aristotle’s testimony is not fit for a work of reconstitution: “for Aristotle, and to 
the chagrin of many Presocratic philologists, this turn to the past is never undertaken with the intention of loyally 
reconstructing the thought of the past.” (Long, 2006, p. 256) “Aristotle’s object is not the reconstruction of the 
thoughts of those who came before, but the attempt to articulate ‘the undetermined possibilities’ of the beings 
with which he is engaged.” (p. 258) “Aristotle shows little interest in the actual arguments they put forth, nor is 
he much concerned with the content their thinking expresses. Indeed, his accounts of their various positions are 
surprisingly formal.” (p. 265) “The irony is that the very formalism that allows Aristotle both to take his 
predecessors seriously and to move beyond them involves a sort of appropriation, an abstraction from their 
original context, indeed a violence that makes the things said, say things differently.” (p. 266-267) 
37 “Aristotle’s attention to τὰ λεγόμενα as φαινόμενα determines his engagement with his predecessors.” (Long, 
2006, p. 265) 
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depends on the interlocutors of the present, not as individual subjects, but as the very listening 
present that philosophize from and with them. This means that ta legomena change.38 
Aristotle provides us with one rendering of ta legomena that flows teleologically towards “the 
truth”, 39 which he occasionally thought to be closer to his own philosophy.40 However, this 
does not mean that we should refrain from trying to read beyond Aristotle’s account in the 
direction of the reconstruction of the philosophies of his predecessors. This sort of effort 
allows new generations to take possession and to philosophize over new renderings of ta 
legomena, with the possibility of bearing new fruits for philosophy. The works of Cherniss 
and others with a more philological take do not interfere in any way with philosophizing over 
Aristotle. They do not make the results of Aristotle’s own philosophy any less valid or 
interesting, any less impressive or valuable. Long’s defense of Aristotle does not seem to me 
to have a real opponent in Cherniss. The critique of Cherniss does not — nor do we have to 
read him as doing so — put under suspicion the quality of Aristotle as a philosopher.41 
                                                           
38 According to Gadamer, beginnings and ends change in the course of time: “our understanding of the beginning 
that emanates from the end is never definitive. It is not the last word simply because even the movement of 
reflection has its place within the context of a beginning less and endless tradition.” (Gadamer, 2001, p. 19) 
39 Long modulates the question of Aristotle’s teleology. He does not agree with the insinuations that Aristotle’s 
dialectics consists in a careful arrangement (and adjustment) of the thoughts of his predecessors in order to make 
them converge to his own system. Such procedure he would call an artificial teleology (2006, p. 256-257), 
implied in the accounts of Cherniss, Collobert and others, even if in different degrees. In his turn, he defends that 
Aristotle’s teleology is a natural one. His telos is the truth, but this is not something previously given. It is a sort 
of optimistic view that inquiry, in time, will inevitably reach or tend to the truth. “If, however, the teleological 
structure of history is understood to be constructed with an eye toward a telos that stands outside of the order 
itself, it ceases to be natural and becomes artificial. If history manifests a natural teleological structure, this can 
only be discerned from within the movement of a history that is itself taken as a phenomenon. The tendency, 
heard in the things said particularly by Cherniss and Mansfeld, to identify Aristotle’s approach to his 
predecessors with an artificial teleology eclipses the extent to which Aristotle turns to the things said out of an 
intuitive awareness of his own historicity.” (Long, 2006, p. 258) “Collobert’s insistence that Aristotle’s 
engagement with his predecessors is ultimately originated by the solutions expressed by Aristotle himself 
eclipses the degree to which Aristotle’s own positions emerge from, and as a result of, a deep engagement with 
the thinking of his predecessors.” (p. 257, n. 40) Cf. this with what Gadamer says about beginnings: “something 
is only ever a beginning in relation to an end or a goal. Between these two, beginning and end, stands an 
indissoluble connection. The beginning always implies the end. Whenever we fail to mention what the beginning 
in question refers to, we say something meaningless. The end determines the beginning, and this is why we get 
into a long series of difficulties. The anticipation of the end is a prerequisite for the concrete meaning of 
beginning.” (Gadamer, 2001, p. 15) 
40 It is hard to deny this in front of Metaphysics A. We also have Cicero’s testimony in Tusculan Disputations 
III.28.69, where he says that Aristotle thought philosophy at his time was closer to completion. That, willingly or 
not, must also be counted among ta legomena from the past (cf. Andrea Wilson Nightingale, 2004, p. 28). 
41 This would be the same as to suspect the quality of Heidegger as a philosopher because of the use he makes of 
Aristotle. In fact, there are those who do just that. Long, perhaps, by defending Aristotle against this pseudo-
attack may be really trying to defend something else. To disregard Heidegger — or Aristotle — over such type 
of accusation is reductionism, to say the least. 
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From the point of view of the possibility of using the history of philosophy, revealing 
itself dynamically as ta legomena,42 the type of warning issued by the work of Cherniss 
produces a crucial effect. It opens possibilities of interpretations and explanations of the 
phenomena that may have been hidden or blocked due to a non-critical acceptance of the 
Aristotelian testimony. It expands the possibilities of openness and, consequently, of 
unveiling our own contemporary world, because it enlarges the scope and the amplitude of ta 
legomena from which philosophical investigations may set forth.43 
Taking, for example, the atomism of Democritus,44 we may say that we now have 
another, or many other Democrituses that are set in opposition — and in tension — with the 
Democritus of Aristotle. We may never be able to say for sure whether one of them 
corresponds to the historical Democritus, and thus fix the past, because the past must always 
be something other. Moreover, Aristotle will always remain fundamental, because the many 
possible Democrituses will always be mediated by Aristotle, even if conceived as anti-
Aristotelian. However, to talk about the many possible Democrituses is already Democritean 
somehow, as in talking about many possible worlds coexisting throughout the infinite void.45 
Yet, this cannot avoid being Aristotelian too, because the anti-Aristotelian Democrituses are 
                                                           
42 Which was brilliantly exposed by Long in his essay. 
43 I admit I have been quoting Gadamer rather ambiguously. Although there are important differences (which I 
will not list here), it can be said that, in general, Gadamer and Long share the same point of view. Gadamer 
clearly advocates that our sole coherent means of access to the beginnings of philosophy, i.e. the Presocratics, is 
via the works of Plato and Aristotle. However, he also says “that something like a general history . . . must be 
written anew by each generation. It seems quite evident to me that along with historical change itself the ways of 
observing and knowing the past must also change. Nevertheless, this truth cannot be applied so easily to the 
philosophical tradition; for in this case it means recognizing that this tradition itself has not already come to its 
conclusion with the great Hegelian synthesis, but that there may be still other expressions of thought that can 
also open new perspectives for us.” (2001, p. 46). It is hard not to see this as conflicting with the assertion that 
Plato and Aristotle’s testimony are our only means of access to the sayings of the early Greek philosophers. If 
each generation should rewrite history, they should be allowed to take whatever tools they can produce to unveil 
its content. I would not say that is a contradiction, but it is certainly a difficulty for Gadamer and Long. What I 
am defending here is that the work of reconstitution of past philosophies is not as contradictory with their view 
of philosophy as they seem to believe. For it aims at achieving some degree of completion that will allow, in the 
end, philosophers to take these reconstituted thoughts as their own starting point for philosophizing. Even if it is 
impossible to assert their correspondence to the actual words and thoughts of the first philosophers, once 
contemporary scholars turn them into a whole (no matter how they have filled the gaps), they will have what is 
required for the practice of philosophy as advocated by Gadamer and Long. “These texts”, says Gadamer about 
Plato and Aristotle’s works — but I would include our reviews of the early Greek philosophers as well — “must 
be continually questioned in such a manner that they answer in a different way each time; for the living dialogue, 
the communication between people, and the participation in the written tradition are all structured in such a way 
that they occur as if by themselves. The tradition is not something rigid; it is not fixed once and for all. There are 
no laws there.” (p. 49) 
44 But this should work for any early Greek philosopher. 
45 This does not mean that any one of the many possible reconstructions of Democritus are valid. Contemporary 
methodology should provide criteria for deciding what is acceptable and what is not. This is, though, subject to 
change, as are the interpretations. 
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nothing more than constructions that depend on the Aristotelian concept of privation. The 
non-being that is privation is not absolute non-being. It depends on the existence of that of 
which it is the privation. And here we are again, back at the beginning. The critique of 
Cherniss’s critique of Aristotle — be it from philological, historical or strictly philosophical 
stances — does nothing more than to emphasize Cherniss’s most important warning, that is, 
that insofar as one cannot avoid resorting to Aristotle when dealing with early Greek 
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